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STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Appellants Edwin Lauder, Cynthia Lauder and Mary Best Ferguson 
(collectively, the "Appellants") seek to overturn the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment, in which the trial court ruled the Appellants failed to establish the legal and 
factual elements necessary to effect a taking of land belonging to their neighbors, Bruce 
and Diane Martin (the "Martins"). In their opening brief, the Appellants raised six issues. 
The Appellants incorrectly framed these issues and the applicable standards of review. 
Two of the issues are simply duplicative of others and all six mischaracterize the trial 
court's April 17,2009 Ruling ("Ruling"). 
The Appellants' first and sixth issues regarding denial and grant of summary 
judgment are the same issue, though the Appellants' phrasing misstates the Ruling. At 
the trial court, the parties agreed there were no genuine issues of fact and filed cross-
motions for summary judgment regarding the identical issue of whether the Appellants 
could satisfy the legal and factual elements of boundary by acquiescence. Grant of the 
Martins5 cross motion is not, as the Appellants describe, "solely" on the basis of denial of 
their own motion. The two hinged on identical factual and legal issues. When the trial 
court concluded that the Appellants could not meet all of the requisite elements, the court 
denied the Appellants' motion and granted the Martins' cross motion. The Martins 
therefore restate the issue as follows: 
Issue 1: Whether the trial court was correct in denying the Appellants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in granting the Martins' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
when the Appellants failed to establish the elements necessary for their claim under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
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Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, "view[ing] the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, f^ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While legal 
determinations are reviewed for correctness, a trial court's legal determination regarding 
acquiescence "is highly fact sensitive and thus the trial court has some measure of 
discretion." Brown v. Jorgensen. 2006 UT App 168, H 8, 136 P.3d 1252 (quoting Argvle 
v. Jones, 2005 UT App 346, U 8,118 P.3d 301). 
The Appellants' second and fourth issues regarding striking of affidavits present 
the same issue, though the Appellants' phrasing misstates the Ruling. In an attempt to 
avoid summary judgment, the Appellants submitted five separate affidavits, each of 
which contained inadmissible testimony that lacked foundation, was not based upon 
personal knowledge, and constituted impermissible legal conclusions. The Martins 
moved to strike the inadmissible portions and the trial court granted that motion. 
Mr. Steve Clark's affidavit was untimely. The Martins therefore were provided an 
opportunity to depose Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark's affidavit must be viewed in light of that 
deposition testimony, as it otherwise would be inadmissible. 
Issue 2: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that affidavits must 
be based upon personal knowledge and cannot contain impermissible legal conclusions 
when it granted the Martins' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of the Affidavits of 
Tony Shiraki, Mary Best Ferguson and Cynthia Lauder; and when it granted the Martins' 
Motion to Strike Inadmissible Portions of the Affidavits of Cynthia Lauder and Edwin 
Lauder. 
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Standard of Review: If a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of an 
out-of-court statement involves a factual determination, "this court will ' apply a clearly 
erroneous standard of review to those [factual] findings.'" Fox v. Brigham Young 
University, 2007 UT App 406, % 13, 176 P.3d 446 (quoting State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, 
H 13, 4 P.3d 778). u[W]here the court's analysis involves a legal determination, such 
determination will be reviewed cfor correctness.'" Id. (quoting Hansen v. Heath, 852 
P.2d 977,979 (Utah 1993)). 
The Appellants' third issue is ambiguous. The Appellants' phrasing of the issue 
describes <cthe Martin affidavits," though the Martins only submitted one affidavit from 
them personally—that of Diane Martin. The Martins also submitted an affidavit from 
Diane Martin's brother, Darrell Eskelson. In reviewing the Appellants' argument, it is 
clear that they seek review of the trial court's decisions as to both the Diane Martin and 
Darrell Eskelson affidavits. The Martins therefore restate the issue as follows: 
Issue 3: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding sufficient personal 
knowledge and foundation to deny the Appellants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible 
Portions of the Affidavits of Darrel Eskelson and Diane Martin. 
Standard of Review: If a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of an 
out-of-court statement involves a factual determination, "this court will 'apply a clearly 
erroneous standard of review to those [factual] findings.'" Fox v. Brigham Young 
University, 2007 UT App 406, H 13, 176 P.3d 446 (quoting State v. Parker. 2000 UT 51, 
H 13, 4 P.3d 778). "[Wjhere the court's analysis involves a legal determination, such 
determination will be reviewed 'for correctness.'" Id. (quoting Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 
977,979 (Utah 1993)). 
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The only remaining issue, numbered as the fifth by the Appellants, misstates the 
trial court's decision as "dismissing" their claim based on estoppel, rather than finding 
that the issue was moot when the Appellants failed to meet the elements necessary for the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Martins therefore restate the issue as follows: 
Issue 4: Whether the trial court was correct in denying the Appellants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment based upon estoppel. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness, €View[ing) the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parly." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 
UT 2, K 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the 
doctrine of estoppel is "applicable to a wide variety of factual and legal situations . . . we 
properly grant the trial court1 s decision [thereon] a fair degree of deference." Bahr v. 
Imus, 2009 UT App 155, f 5, 211 P.3d 987 (quoting Department of Human Servs. ex rel. 
Parker v. Irizarrv, 945 P.2d 676, 678 (Utah 1997)). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves a boundary dispute between the Martins and two sets of 
neighbors, the Lauders and the Fergusons. In considering cross-motions for summary 
judgment, Third District Court Judge LA. Dever granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Martins, rejecting the Appellants5 argument that they had acquired a piece of the 
Martins' land by operation of the doctrines of boundary by acquiescence or estoppel. As 
the parties seeking to move a deeded boimdary line, the Appellants bore the burden of 
showing each of the four elements of boundary by acquiescence under Utah law, or each 
of the three elements of equitable estoppel. The Honorable Judge Dever ruled that the 
Appellants failed to proffer admissible evidence sufficient to demonstrate the legal and 
factual elements necessary for their claims of boundary by acquiescence or estoppel. As 
all parties agreed there were no issues of material fact, no facts remained for trial. The 
trial court summarily concluded that the Appellants could no longer presumptively 
encroach upon the Martins' land. 
In making his ruling, the Honorable Judge Dever also made rulings striking 
portions of the Appellants' proffered affidavit testimony as lacking foundation and 
impermissibly stating ultimate legal conclusions. The Appellants seek to overturn the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment so that they may continue encroaching upon the 
Martins' land. To overturn summary judgment, however, this Court must also overturn 
the trial court's ruling striking the Appellants' inadmissible evidence. 
This case was not a close one on either the law or the facts. No issues or 
interpretations of law are at stake. The Appellants failed to cany their burden of 
10884410 5 
providing admissible evidence to sustain their claim to take the Martins5 land. The 
Appellants failed to meet Utah's black-letter requirement of acquiescence for at least 20 
years; the Appellants failed to show acquiescence on the Martins' side; the Appellants 
failed to show acquiescence on their own side; and the Appellants failed to show any 
facts amounting to the elements of estoppel except for their own erroneous and 
unwarranted assumptions. 
n . Course of Proceedings 
After first attempting to resolve this dispute by obtaining a survey and having a 
meeting of the parties, which meeting the Appellants rejected, on November 27, 2007, 
the Martins filed a complaint to quiet title pursuant to the Utah Quiet Title Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-40-1, et. seq. (2007) asking the court to confirm the Martins' ownership 
of their property within their deeded boundary line. (R. 1-5). The Appellants responded, 
arguing that their presumptive encroachment was sanctioned under a claim for boundary 
by acquiescence. (R. 8-12). At the close of fact discovery, no facts remained in dispute 
and the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. (R. at 41-117). 
On April 17, 2009, after full briefing and oral argument, the Honorable Judge 
Dever issued his reasoned, eight-page Ruling, granting summary judgment to the 
Martins. (R. 428-436). Judge Dever ruled that the Appellants did not and could not 
demonstrate the legal and factual elements necessary to take a portion of the Martins' 
land by acquiescence or estoppel. (R. at 434-435). The Martins were declared owners in 
fee simple absolute. (R. at 473-474). 
This appeal followed. 
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IIL Statement of Facts 
The Martins own .21 acres of real property located at 1907 E. Parkridge Drive in 
Cottonwood Heights, Utah. (R. at 2, 9, 68, 91). The Martins acquired their property in 
2007 from Diane Martin's parents, who had owned the property since 1972. (R. at 91). 
The surveyed northern boundary of the Martins' property follows a straight line from east 
to west. (R. at 68). Sometime in the mid-1970s Diane Martin's father erected a chain-
link fence two to four feet within the Martins' deeded property line at the edge of a drop-
off, which fence does not follow the straight property line and does not conform to the 
placement of adjoining fences, except at the two corner posts. (R. at 2,9, 68,91). Diane 
Martin and her brother, Darrell, testified that the fence was constructed by their parents to 
section off a steep drop in elevation near the back of the family's yard. (R. at 91, 96). 
The Lauder Appellants' prior owner confirmed this drop in elevation. (R. at 409). Diane 
Martin and her brother also testified that the Martin family continued to use and maintain 
their land beyond the fence up to their deeded property line, including to store 
construction debris. (R. at 91, 96). The Lauder Appellants' prior owner confirmed this 
fact as well. (R. at 418). 
The land beyond the Martins' property line, now owned by Appellants, was an 
empty lot until the early 1990s, less than 20 years ago. (R. at 2, 9, 92). The Appellants 
purchased their respective lots in 1991 and 1994. (R. at 154, 161). The Appellants' 
respective lots both adjoin a portion of the Martins' lot along the Martins' back property 
line. (R. at 2,9, 68). Sometime after their purchases, having never surveyed the property 
or verified the deeded lines, the Appellants began presumptively encroaching upon the 
Martins' property up to the fence, rather than adhering to the true deeded line. (R. at 154, 
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161)* The Appellants presented no admissible evidence regarding whether the Martins' 
predecessors consented to their encroachment. (R. at 344,380-382,386-387).l 
The Martins, however, certainly did not consent to the Appellants' encroachment 
(R. at 92). On November 27, 2007 the Martins brought the present action to quiet title in 
the property up to their deeded property line. (R. at 1-5). The Appellants responded by 
claiming rights to the land under the legal doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (R. at 8-
12). Cross-motions for summary judgment were fully briefed and then heard by the trial 
court at oral argument on April 1,2009. (R. at 41-117). As the parties seeking to move a 
legal boundary and take property they never purchased, the Appellants bore the burden of 
proof regarding each element of boundary by acquiescence. (R. at 429).2 
Before the trial court, the Appellants "concedefd] that they did not own their 
respective properties until, at the earliest, 1991, which is years less than the 20 years 
required for boundary by acquiescence." (R. at 430). Instead, after the close of fact 
discovery, and realizing after filing their motion for summary judgment they fell short, 
the Lauder Appellants attempted to meet Utah's 20-year requirement on their side of the 
1
 In their opening brief, Appellants rely on affidavit testimony that was properly stricken 
by the trial court. (R. 344,380-382, 386-387). Appellants claim that the Martins' 
predecessor ccwas present and aware" of their encroachment "and never objected." The 
trial court found that this assertion was inadmissible because it lacked foundation. The 
Appellants had and have no foundation to testify about the Martins' predecessors' states 
of mind, their beliefs, or their feelings. 
2
 In their opening brief, Appellants have asserted a number of factual statements that 
were not raised before the trial court and do not have support in the record. For example, 
on page 18, Appellants assert for the first time that "[t]here was no gate in the fence " and 
that "[tjhere was trash and leaves" in the area. Brief of Appellants, p. 18. The Martins 
object where these factual statements are not included in the Appellants' "Statement of 
Facts" and do not have a supporting citation to the record to show that they were raised 
before the trial court. Moreover, the Martins are prepared to present evidence to refute 
these new and improper statements should a court consider them. 
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fence by identifying a previously-undisclosed witness, trying to tack onto a prior owner, 
Mr. Steven Clark. (R. at 175-202, 430). No evidence was presented or evaluated 
whatsoever regarding the prior owner of the Ferguson parcel. (R. at 175-202,430). The 
Martins moved to strike the tardy disclosure and testimony of Mr. Clark, but the trial 
court denied the Martins' motion and instead allowed the Martins time to depose Mr. 
Clark. (R. at 386-387). 
In considering Mr. Clark's affidavit along with his deposition testimony, the trial 
court considered the following facts: 
• Mr. Clark testified that "the deed conveying the lot to the Lauders was from 
Designer Homes, Inc., the developer, and not [Mr.] Clark;" (R. at 432); 
• "No evidence was presented as to the developer's understanding of the 
disputed boundary line;" (R. at 432-433); and 
• "[W]hen asked whether during the five years [Mr.] Clark left any evidence 
suggesting to anyone looking at the disputed area that he asserted 
ownership of it, [Mr.] Clark responded, 'Not other than to plan its use;"' 
(R. at 432). 
Based upon these facts, the trial court concluded that the Appellants failed to establish 
acquiescence on the Lauder parcel through Mr. Clark's testimony. (R. at 434-435). As 
the only prior owner witness offered, the trial court found that "Clark's statements are 
inconsistent with mutual acquiescence." (R. at 431). 
Next, the Appellants attempted to use Mr. Clark to claim that the Martins and their 
predecessors had acquiesced or impliedly consented to moving the boundary through 
non-use or silence. (R. at 431). In considering Mr. Clark's testimony regarding 
acquiescence on the Martins' side, the trial court considered the following facts: 
• "[Mr.] Clark acknowledges that items were discarded beyond the fence 
either by Plaintiffs, others, or both;" (R. at 431-432); 
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• "[Mr.] Clark acknowledged that it appeared that the items had been 
discarded from the other side of the fence, that is Plaintiffs'; side;" (R. at 
432); 
• "[Mr.] Clark was uncertain as to whether that the refuse pile was added to 
during the five year period in which he was the lot owner;" (R. at 432); 
• Both the Martins and Mr. Clark described a "slope" in the disputed area, 
that the Martins' predecessors sought to enclose. (R. at 434); and 
• '^ Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs paid property taxes on the full 
area of the deeded property, including the area in dispute." (R. at 433). 
The trial court concluded that Appellants failed to establish acquiescence on the Martins' 
side, even by silence, through Mr. Clark's testimony. (R. at 434-435). 
Based upon the foregoing, the trial court ruled that "[Appellants] cannot show 
acquiescence as a matter of law." (R, at 434). Where the factual elements of 
acquiescence were missing, the trial court further ruled that the claim of boundary by 
estoppel also failed. (R. at 435). The trial court ruled that "[Appellants] have no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in any of [the Martins'] property found within the [surveyed] 
boundary lines . . . and the [Martins] are declared the owners in fee simple absolute, 
subject to any lawful encumbrances of record." (R. at 473-474). The trial court entered 
judgment in favor of the Martins quieting title in the disputed area in accord with the 
surveyed boundary line. (R. at 473-474). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellants' have shown no grounds for reversing the trial court's ruling. The 
facts of this case are undisputed, as evidenced by the fact that all parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment. The Appellants' claim for boundary by acquiescence 
fails where they have presumptively encroached upon the Martins' property for fewer 
than 20 years and failed to show sufficient evidence regarding their predecessors. The 
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Appellants further failed to show acquiescence by the Martins, the Martins' predecessors, 
or the Appellants5 own predecessors sufficient for boundary by acquiescence or estoppel. 
As the party seeking to move a deeded line and take property they never owned, the 
burden of proof rested squarely on the Appellants for all and every element. The trial 
court correctly determined that Appellants failed to meet the necessary factual elements. 
There is nothing for the Court to adjudicate here, other than the plain propriety of the trial 
court's judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants have presented no basis, in law or in fact, to merit reversal by this 
Court of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Decided on Summary Judgment that Appellants' 
Claim of Boundary by Acquiescence Failed as a Matter of Law. 
The trial court determined that undisputed facts preclude the Appellants' boundary 
by acquiescence claim. Where no disputed facts remained, the trial court correctly 
denied the Appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted the Martins' cross-
motion. There is no dispute as to where the correct, surveyed property line lies. As the 
parties seeking to avoid and expand the surveyed legal boundary they agreed to when 
they purchased their own lots, Utah law placed the burden on the Appellants to prove 
boundary by acquiescence. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 16, 44 P.3d 781. Boundary 
by acquiescence, as explained in the trial court's order, required the Appellants to show 
certain factual elements that have held steady under Utah law for decades: "(i) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence 
in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining landowners." 
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RHNCorp-v.ViebelL 2004 UT 60, % 23,96 P.3d 935 (quoting Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 P.2d 
1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)). "[F]ailure to meet any one of the elements of the doctrine 
defeats the boundary." IdL (quoting Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1998)) 
(emphasis in original)). Here, the trial court determined that based on the undisputed 
facts, Appellants failed to meet their burden to establish: (1) the requisite "long period of 
time," and (2) mutual acquiescence. Appellants have no basis in law or in fact to dispute 
either of these determinations. Thus, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
A. There is No Dispute That Appellants Failed to Meet Utah's 20-Year 
Requirement. 
Before a court will move a surveyed legal boundary, Utah law imposes a hard 
requirement of acquiescence on both sides for 20 consecutive years with no exceptions. 
RHN Corp., 2004 UT at ^  30; Ault 2002 UT at 123. The strict standard "best achieve[s] 
the repose, stability of title, and prevention of litigation that the boundary by 
acquiescence doctrine should foster." Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078,1081 (Utah 1996). 
Appellants failed to meet this hard 20-year requirement on their own side of the fence 
line—regardless of their failure to meet it on the Martins' side. Setting aside the disputes 
between the current owners, Appellants failed to show acquiescence of the prior owners, 
which they need in order to make their claim to take the Martins' land. 
i. Appellants Presented No Evidence Whatsoever Regarding 
Mrs. Ferguson *s Predecessors. 
Appellants concede that Ms. Ferguson has not owned or occupied her property 
until 1994. Although this is fewer than the 20 years needed, the Appellants have 
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provided no evidence whatsoever regarding Ms. Ferguson's predecessor. Thus, as to 
Ferguson, this Court should affirm the summary judgment without further review. 
ii. Appellants' Admissible Evidence Regarding the Landers' 
Predecessors Was Inadequate as a Matter of Law. 
Appellants concede that the Lauders have not owned or occupied their property 
until 1991 at the earliest. Because this is fewer than the 20 years needed, after they filed 
their motion for summary judgment the Lauders scrambled to try augmenting their years 
onto a predecessor through an untimely affidavit of Mr. Clark, the purported prior owner 
of the Lauders' lot. Appellants sought and found Mr. Clark only after realizing, when 
they had already moved for summary judgment, they did not have the requisite 20 years. 
Mr. Clark testified, however, that the deed conveying the lot to the Lauders' deed shows 
that the Lauders purchased their property not from Mr. Clark, but from Designer Homes, 
Inc. The Lauders have provided no testimony whatsoever regarding Designer Homes, 
Inc. 
Mr. Clark was unable to recall or explain the period of time between his 
ownership and that of Designer Homes, Inc., or the period of time between Designer 
Homes, Inc.'s ownership and that of the Lauders. The trial court then applied these facts 
to Utah law holding that even a brief disruption in the 20-year period will <crestart[] the 
clock for determining boundary by acquiescence." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1258 
(Utah 1998). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that Appellants could not show 
acquiescence as a matter of law on their own side of the fence for 20 years, regardless of 
claims regarding a 20-year period on the Martins' side. 
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B. There is No Dispute That Appellants Failed to Show Acquiescence on the 
Martins' Side. 
Although the Appellants' claim already fails where they cannot meet Utah's 20-
year requirement, the Appellants also failed to show any acquiescence whatsoever on the 
Martins' side of the fence. "To acquiesce means to 'recognize and treat an observable 
line, such as a fence, as the boundary dividing the owner's property from the adjacent 
landowner's property.5" RHN Corp., 2004 UT at Tf 24 (quoting Auh> 2002 UT at Tf 18). 
Disregarding for a moment the fact that the Appellants have not owned their properties 
for the requisite 20 years, the Appellants argue that acquiescence is shown on the 
Martins' side by "silence." 
This Court recently examined the issue of silence as acquiescence in Smith v. 
Security Investment LTD, 2009 UT App 355, 644 Utah Adv. Rep. 13. In Smith, Security 
Investment was found to have impliedly acquiesced to a fence as a boundary based upon 
its "silence, inaction . . . failure to object. . . [and] complete lack of use of the disputed 
property with no objective actions supporting that it claimed ownership of the disputed 
parcel." Id. at f 8. These facts, however, are not present here. 
Appellants cannot dispute that the Martin family did, in fact, use and occupy the 
disputed area over the fence. Diane Martin testified of her personal experiences 
maintaining the area, including planting grapevines, removing weeds, and chasing away 
pests. She also testified of the Martin family storing building materials in a portion of the 
disputed area. The Appellants did not and cannot refute this testimony as they did not 
own their respective properties at the time and thus have no personal knowledge. 
Again, since Appellants cannot testify as to facts before their ownership, they tried 
to use the testimony of Mr. Clark. Mr. Clark, however, confirmed the Martins' 
10884410 14 
description of a slope in elevation leading up to the fence and he confirmed that the 
Martins' predecessors used the area they owned beyond the fence to store construction 
debris. Instead of supporting Appellants' claim, the trial court concluded that Mr. Clark 
brought forth facts suggesting that the Martins' prior owners did not treat, and thus did 
not acquiesce to the fence as a boundary. The trial court also noted the Martins have paid 
property taxes on the disputed area. While not dispositive under Utah law, "[t]he 
knowing payment of taxes on the disputed property . . . is inconsistent with 
acquiescence." Argyle v. Jones. 2005 UT App 346, ^ 15, 118 P.3d 301. Thus, the trial 
court correctly concluded that the Appellants failed to show acquiescence on the Martins' 
side and could not do so impliedly by silence. 
C. There is No Dispute That Appellants Failed to Show Acquiescence on 
Their Own Side, 
Just as dispositive of the issue, however, the Appellants failed to show 
acquiescence on their own side. A subjective belief that a fence is the property line is not 
enough. Brown v. Jorgensen 2006 UT App 168,116, 136 P.3d 1252; see ako Hales v. 
Frakes, 600 P.2d 556, 559 (Utah 1979) (finding that "occupation to the fence without 
interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's acquiescence in the fence as a 
boundary"). And, the trial court noted that occupancy must be "at such reasonable 
intervals . . . as to have knowledge of the physical facts" demonstrating acquiescence. 
Harding v. Allen. 353 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1960) (overruled on other grounds). That 
never happened here. 
The Appellants attempted again to rely on facts through Mr. Clark, and again, the 
trial court correctly found those facts insufficient under Utah law. Mr. Clark testified that 
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his use of what became (he Lauders* property consisted of: visiting on occasion, standing 
with his back to the fence and planning (only in his head) for possible construction 
someday. The Appellants brought forth no fact demonstrating that Mr. Clark knowingly 
exerted ownership over the disputed area and actively treated the fence as though it was 
the true boundary on the Lauder parcel. Moreover, as discussed above, the Appellants 
brought forth no facts whatsoever regarding the predecessor to the Ferguson parcel. 
D. Where the Facts Were Appellants* Burden to Establish, Summary 
Judgment for the Martins was Appropriate. 
Finally, the Appellants claim that the trial court granted summary judgment to the 
Martins solely on the grounds that he denied summary judgment of the Appellants. The 
trial court deserves a more respectful inference. The burden of proof on each element 
rested solely on the Appellants, discovery was over, and they failed to meet their burden. 
Summary judgment for the Martins was appropriate. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Decided That the Appellants' Argument for 
Estoppel Failed. 
Where their boundary by acquiescence claim fails, the Appellants want the Court 
to review the trial court's dismissal of their equitable estoppel argument as well. 
Appellants argue that the trial court incorrectly decided their estoppel claim based on the 
same undisputed facts as their boundary by acquiescence claim. Appellants5 claim for 
equitable estoppel, however, fails on its own, no matter its cross-over elements with 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Equitable estoppel requires showing (1) a failure to act that is inconsistent with a 
claim, (2) reasonable action, taken in reliance on the failure to act, and (3) injury. Dahl 
Inv. Co. v. Hughes, 2004 UT App 391, *h 14, 101 P.3d 830. The Appellants' claim fails 
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on both the first and second requirements. First, equitable estoppel is generally only 
applied in "circumstances involving misrepresentations of past or present fact." 
Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2007 UT 28, ^  15,158 P.3d 1088. Second, a party 
cannot claim reasonable action in reliance when the party could have known the truth 
through reasonable diligence. Id. at ^  33. 
Considering the admissible portions of the Appellants' affidavits, their only facts 
in support of estoppel are: that they made improvements beyond the deeded property line, 
and that in 2007, the Martins obtained a survey and informed Appellants that they were 
encroaching over the deeded line. The Appellants have never claimed that the Martins or 
their predecessors in interest misrepresented facts to entice them to act, and neither had a 
legal duty to clarify the Appellants' erroneous and unexpressed assumptions. Further, 
reasonable diligence by the Appellants, including making inquiries or obtaining a survey, 
would have uncovered the true boundaries, making their alleged reliance unreasonable. It 
has nothing to do with the Martins that the Appellants erroneously and unjustifiably 
assumed land they never purchased was theirs. The claim fails on its own. 
This Court recently examined a boundary by equitable estoppel claim in Bahr v. 
hnus, 2009 UT App 155, 211 P.3d 987. In Bahr. adjoining landowners constructed a 
fence together that separated their properties, id. at Tf 2, a dispositive fact that does not 
exist here. This Court went on to consider many of the same facts that would be relevant 
to boundary by acquiescence, but which do not exist in this case: both owners were 
uncertain of the true deeded line; both owners participated in constructing the fence; both 
owners made improvements up to the finished fence; and the finished fence sat as a 
boundary for nearly 20 years. Id. at ^  2-3, 13. When a new owner objected to the fence 
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as a boundary, this Court reasoned that the knowledge and actions of the new owner's 
predecessor had already established an equitable estoppel cladm. Id. at ff 13, 15. Thus, 
the reasoning of this Court in Bahr has no application to the undisputed facts here. 
The Appellants' no more met the burden on this claim than they did on the claim 
for boundary by acquiescence. The failure to provide the necessary facts showing 
boundary by acquiescence is also fatal to the Appellants' equitable estoppel claim. They 
have no evidence whatsoever regarding consent, acquiescence, or agreements with the 
Martins or the Martins' predecessors. They rely solely on their own erroneous 
assumptions. Where the facts of this case are undisputed, no issue remained for trial. 
The trial court was correct in summarily adjudicating this claim as well and in rejecting 
Appellants' efforts take the Martins' land. 
HI. The Trial Court Correctly Struck the Inadmissible Portions of the Affidavits 
Submitted by Appellants Because the Affidavits Lacked Foundation and 
Personal Knowledge and Contained Impermissible Legal Conclusions. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's rulings on affidavits. No matter what 
anyone claims in affidavits, however, whether the Appellants themselves or other 
neighbors, the Appellants failed to provide testimony of actual facts satisfying the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence or estoppel. They did not, and cannot, provide 
testimony of the knowledge and understanding of the Martins, the Martins' predecessors, 
or their own predecessors. Even if the Court were to reverse the decisions on certain 
affidavits, the Appellants' overarching claim remains uhdisputedly without support. Still, 
the trial court correctly determined that the affidavits submitted by the Appellants were 
largely inadmissible where they lacked personal knowledge and primarily stated the 
Appellants own erroneous legal conclusions. 
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Affidavits supporting a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate "personal 
knowledge . . . [ofj facts as would be admissible in evidence." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
"Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment." GNS Partnership v. Fullmer. 873 P.2d 1157, 1164 (Utah Ct App. 1994) 
(quoting D & L Supply v. Saurinl 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989)). Accordingly, 
affidavits that do not comply with Rule 56(e) and the Utah Rules of Evidence are subject 
to a motion to strike. Id (citing Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352, 353-54 
(Utah 1972)). When affidavits assert facts that are "not based on personal knowledge, 
lack foundation, are conclusory, and contain hearsay," they should be stricken. Murdock 
v. Springville Mun. Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). The affidavits of Tony Shiraki, 
Mary Best Ferguson, Edwin Lauder, and the two affidavits by Cynthia Lauder are all 
deficient and were properly stricken for at least the following three reasons: 
A. The Appellants' Proffered Affidavits Are Inadmissible Because They Lack 
Personal Knowledge. 
First, an affiant can only testify as to matters of which he or she has personal 
knowledge. Utah R. Evid. 602. Rule 602 Requires that the witness have the opportunity 
and the capacity to perceive the events in question." State v. Eldridge, 773 P.2d 29, 33 
(Utah 1989). For an affidavit to be admissible, a witness must have "firsthand knowledge 
of the events he is testifying about so as to present the most accurate information to the 
finder of fact." U.S. v. Hoffaer. 777 F.2d 1423,1425 (10th Cir. 1985). 
The trial court correctly struck portions of the Appellants' affidavits where they 
purported to claim what the Martins and their predecessors knew, were thinking, or were 
feeling. The proffered affidavits also make statements about "never witness[ing]" certain 
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facts and then testifying that those facts did or did not exist Other statements by the 
Appellants themselves 'testify" of facts occurring long before they purchased their own 
properties. This self-serving 'testimony" is improper and inadmissible under Rule 602. 
After reviewing the statements, the trial court correctly determined that certain of the 
affidavit testimony lacked foundation based upon personal knowledge, and was therefore 
inadmissible. 
B. The Appellants' Proffered Affidavits Contain Inadmissible Hearsay. 
Second, an affidavit cannot include inadmissible hearsay. Utah R. Evid. 801(c), 
802; Poteet v. White, 2006 UT 63, U 10, 147 P3d 439. Classic hearsay is "testimony 
offered to prove facts of which the witness has no personal knowledge, but which have 
been told to him by others." State v. Sibert 310 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1957). An affiant 
without <chis own knowledge or observation, but is acting as a conduit to relay that of 
others," lacks trustworthiness. IcL Thus, Utah Courts are finn that an affidavit consisting 
of inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered in summary judgment. Id; Wayment v. 
Clear Channel Broadcasting. Inc.. 2005 UT 25, K 4K 116 P.3d 271. 
The trial court correctly determined here that the proffered affidavits contained 
testimony based solely on what the Appellants were told by other neighbors, such as 
stories of the fence's history before their own involvement with the property. Appellants 
had every opportunity to depose or obtain affidavits from these people. They chose not 
to. Under Rule 802, the Appellants were not allowed to make statements based on what 
they heard from other parties. After reviewing the statements made, the trial court 
correctly struck those statements that were based upon hearsay. 
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C. The Appellants' Proffered Affidavits Contain Impermissible Legal 
Conclusions. 
Third, affidavits containing conclusory '^ unsubstantiated legal opinions and 
conclusions" must be stricken. Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 
81, f 54, 13 P.3d 581; Murdoch 982 P.2d at 72. Such legal opinions <cwould not be 
admissible in evidence and may not be considered on summary judgment under Rule 
56(e)." Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, the 
statements cannot create an issue of fact and should be stricken. Dairy Prod. Servs., 2000 
UT 81 at 1(54. 
Each and every one of the Appellants' proffered affidavits recites as testimony" 
blatant legal conclusions that the Appellants were legally correct in taking the Martins' 
property. Each affiant provides his or her own unsubstantiated legal opinion about 
moving the boundary line in accord with the Appellants5 illegal encroachment. The 
Appellants' own self-serving legal opinions are not facts and cannot be considered as 
factual testimony. After reviewing those statements, the trial court correctly struck the 
legal conclusions and refused to consider them in summary judgment. 
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IV. The Trial Court Correctly Allowed the Affidavits Submitted by the Martins 
Because the Affidavits Demonstrated Personal Knowledge* 
As with the issue regarding the Appellants' affidavits, even if the Court were to 
reverse the trial court's decisions on admissibility of the Martins' affidavits, the 
Appellants' overarching claim remains unsupported. The issues are irrelevant and 
nondispositive by reason of the Appellants' undisputed failure of proof Still, the trial 
court correctly determined that the affidavits of Diane Martins and her brother, Darrell 
Eskelson, were properly based upon personal knowledge. 
An affidavit must set forth personaJ knowledge. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). Utah's 
Rule of Evidence 602 requires ccthe opportunity and the capacity to perceive the events in 
question." Eldridge, 773 P.2d at 33. A witness must have "firsthand knowledge of the 
events he is testifying about so as to present the most accurate information to the finder of 
fact." Hoffher, 777 F.2d at 1425. As the trial court concluded, Darrell Eskelson and 
Diane Martin clearly had and have personal knowledge of the facts surroimding their 
parents' home. 
As both Diane and Darrell explained, the Martins' predecessors in interest were 
Diane and DarrelPs parents, Joe and Helen Eskelson. Joe and Helen Eskelson bought 
their family a home sometime in 1972. At that time, some of their children, including 
their son Darrell, lived with them in the new home. Their adult daughter, Diane Martin, 
did not live there, but visited her family frequently. Darrell moved out of his parents' 
home sometime in 1978. As both Darrell and Diane explain, they continued to visit the 
home of their parents up until Joe and Helen passed away in 1998 and 2006, respectively. 
During those visits, they helped with maintenance, they used the back yard, and they 
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assisted their parents as they aged. After Helen's passing, Diane took ownership of her 
parents' home. 
The trial court correctly found that Darrell and Diane have personal knowledge 
regarding their parents' home, which the Martins' affidavits set forth. Darrell and Diane 
had ample opportunity and capacity to perceive the events that they each recount 
Appellants never deposed a single witness, and so took no opportunity to challenge or 
cross-examine on the points made in the affidavits. Neither affidavit attempts to guess 
what the Martins' predecessors thought or did. Neither affidavit attempts to recount 
hearsay or impose their own legal conclusions. The affidavits simply explain first-hand 
memories and experiences. Such testimony is sufficient to provide accurate information 
to the Court, and thus the trial court was correct in finding the two affidavits admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellants have shown no basis to reverse the trial court. Because the 
undisputed facts show no acquiescence and basis for estoppel, and occupation for less 
than 20 years, there is no just outcome other than to affirm the trial court below and 
restore quiet title to all of the land the Martins purchased and for which they continue to 
pay taxes. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of January, 2010. 
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